John Porter Lecture:Liberal Nationalisms revisited by Kennedy, James
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John Porter Lecture
Citation for published version:
Kennedy, J 2016, 'John Porter Lecture: Liberal Nationalisms Revisited' Canadian Review of Sociology, vol.
53, no. 1, pp. 7-25. DOI: 10.1111/cars.12090
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/cars.12090
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Canadian Review of Sociology
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Kennedy, J. (2016), John Porter Lecture: Liberal
Nationalisms Revisited. Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie, 53: 7–25, which has
been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cars.12090/abstract. This article may be
used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 1 
John Porter Lecture: Liberal Nationalisms Revisited1  
 
JAMES KENNEDY 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Liberal Nationalisms: Empire, State and Civil Society in Scotland and Quebec argues that the 
emergence and character of nationalism is directly related to changes in patterns of 
political rule and the liberal settlements that underlay that rule. The focus is on the 
emergence of two nationalist groups in Scotland and Québec at the beginning of the 
twentieth century: the Young Scots’ Society and the Ligue nationaliste canadienne. 
They exhibited liberal nationalisms differently (1) in response to the British Empire’s 
predatory imperial policies, (2) in the perception that their states had failed to 
effectively accommodate the Scottish and French Canadian nations, and more 
problematically (3) in the place of organised religion in civil society. Their responses 
suggest the emergence of two quite distinct liberal nationalisms: one in which the 
emphasis was on universal individual rights, and the other in which particular group 
rights were more clearly favoured. The article offers some further reflection on the 
relationship between nationalism and liberalism, specifically on the existence of a 
symbiotic relationship, and more generally that liberalism is successful when 
embedded in nationalism. 
 
Liberal Nationalisms: Empire, State and Civil Society in Scotland and Quebec soutient que 
l’émergence et le caractère du nationalisme sont directement liés aux changements des 
modèles de gouvernance politique, ainsi que les politiques libérales sur lesquelles 
repose cette gouvernance. L’article se concentre sur l’émergence au début du 
vingtième siècle de deux groupes nationalistes en Écosse et au Québec: les Young 
Scots’ Society et la Ligne nationaliste canadienne. Les deux groupes ont démontré des 
nationalismes libéraux différents: (1) en réponse aux politiques exploitatrices 
impériales de l’Empire Britannique; (2) face à la perception d’échec de leurs États à 
efficacement accommoder les nations Écossaise et Canadienne Française et, plus 
problématiquement, (3) à la place d’une religion organisée dans la société civile. Leurs 
réponses démontrent l’émergence de nationalismes libéraux très distincts : un dont 
l’emphase était sur les droits individuels universels et l’autre dont les groupes 
particuliers étaient clairement favorisés. Cet article offre une réflexion plus poussée sur 
la relation entre le nationalisme et le libéralisme, plus précisément sur l’existence d’une 
relation symbiotique et plus généralement sur le fait que le libéralisme est atteint avec 
succès lorsqu’intégré au nationalisme. 
 
 
A key feature of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum was the character of the 
nationalism that was exhibited by the ‘Yes campaign’, a campaign that stimulated remarkable 
                                                        
1 It is a great honour to receive the John Porter prize. As a graduate student, Porter’s Vertical 
Mosaic was compulsory reading for the ethnic relations area exam. I learned much from that 
work. I would like to express my gratitude and thanks to Jim Connelly and the Canadian 
Sociological Association’s John Porter Award Committee, to Rima Wilkes, to John A Hall 
and most especially to Lilli Riga. 
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political engagement. The campaign emphasised a progressive and social democratic vision 
of an independent Scotland; it was at pains to emphasise that its nationalism was ‘civic’ and 
inclusive. Indeed, this was reflected in the referendum electorate, agreed by the Scottish 
government, which was restricted to those residing in Scotland, rather than those who might 
consider themselves Scottish living elsewhere. Outside commentators were struck by the 
progressive and open nature, at least rhetorically, of this nationalism (cf. Boisvert 2014). In 
Liberal Nationalisms, the focus is on the character of nationalism promoted by two groups in 
Scotland and Quebec at the beginning of the twentieth century. There is no attempt to link 
these distinct historical moments. Rather the attempt is to examine the sources of the 
contrasting adherence to liberal forms of nationalism expressed by these groups, which it is 
hoped might have more general implications. I return briefly to current events in the 
conclusion. 
 
The book argues that the emergence, and character of nationalism is directly related to 
changes in the patterns of political rule, but also to the prevailing liberalism within which 
these institutions were embedded. In this article I want to lay out the argument, findings and 
implications of the book in four steps. First, I begin by outlining the conceptual issues at 
stake, namely how nationalism is characterised and my own focus on liberal nationalism, 
before briefly discussing the research design and choice of data. Here I introduce the two 
groups, the Young Scots’ Society and the Ligue nationaliste canadienne, and the archival data 
upon which the book is based. I then turn to the book’s substantive contribution, which 
focuses on these groups’ responses to the political institutions that governed Scotland and 
Quebec: empire, state and civil society. Finally, I offer some reflections on the significance of 
this research, highlighting the relationship between liberalism and nationalism.  
 
CONCEPTUAL PUZZLE 
 
The central orienting question is what affects the character of nationalism? Before 
addressing this issue it is first important to discuss how the character of nationalism has been 
conceptualised. The dominant view is that nationalism takes one of two characters: ethnic or 
civic. Their origins are familiar: civic nationalism arose in western Europe within established 
states, residency and political allegiance are its markers. The ethnic variant is eastern in 
origin, with birth and kinship ties as its makers. There is a long lineage of scholarship here. It 
begins with the historian Hans Kohn (1944), through the political theorist John Plamenatz 
(1973), and was influential in the theories of nationalism presented by Ernest Gellner (1983) 
and Anthony Smith (1986). Rogers Brubaker’s (1992) examination of contemporary 
citizenship laws in France and Germany made critical use of this dichotomy, arguing that it 
was jus soli and residency that marked civic citizenship in France, a reflection that the state 
had been established prior to nationhood, while jus sanguinis and ancestry was prevalent in 
Germany where in contrast to France a conception of nation was in place before statehood.  
 
There are, I think, two immediate problems with this characterisation. The first is that the 
use of civic and ethnic as descriptors are individually highly problematic and need to be 
rethought. Bernard Yack (1999) has brilliantly deconstructed the myths surrounding the 
characterisation of civic nationalism, not least making clear that it is culturally infused, that 
birth is the chief means by which it is acquired and civic nations have violent histories, 
thereby successfully refuting claims that civic nationalism is purely political, voluntary and 
pacific. Indeed we might go further, and suggest that in the characterisation of civic 
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nationalism, liberal and republican variants have been conflated. That there is a need to 
disentangle the two ideologies that underpin civic nationalism; they are not the same, so 
while liberalism makes no claim to universal truth, and is thereby tolerant of diverse 
opinions, republicanism has a clear vision of the good life and is intolerant of competing 
views. This suggests very different sorts of ‘civic’ nationalisms. The distinctiveness of ethnic 
nationalism can also be questioned not least since all nationalisms draw on ethnicity in the 
anthropological sense of this concept, that is, language, dialect, accent, religion, etc. are 
ubiquitous as markers of distinction (cf. Eriksen 2010). And how ethnicity is invoked is not 
static, it is a dynamic process subject to change, allowing for transformation in the ways in 
which ethnicity is used (Aktürk 2012). The more general problem is that viewing nationalism 
in binary terms, as civic or ethnic, has the effect of essentialising nationalism as either one or 
the other. And yet as has already been suggested, empirically and conceptually the distinction 
is not clear-cut and suggests a reconceptualization of the character of nationalism, albeit a 
modest one. 
 
The view taken here is that nationalism is a modern ideology. It was sociologically rare to 
achieve the degree of horizontal communication in pre-modern society for the idea of a 
popular nation to have purchase (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983). It took the ‘dual 
revolution’, England’s industrial revolution and the French and American political 
revolutions, for nationalism to gain currency (Kumar 1988). However, as an ideology it is 
rather empty, besides promoting identification with the nation in a myriad of ways, it takes 
its content from elsewhere. John Hall (2003: 15-16) offers a compelling characterisation of 
nationalism. Hall suggests that nationalism, like Freud’s characterisation of the libido, can be 
understood as ‘essentially labile, characteristically absorbing the flavours of the historical 
forces with which it interacts’. In other words it is an unstable, promiscuous ideology, which 
is prone to change as it interacts with other ideologies. Conservatism, socialism, Marxism, 
and feminism are all contenders here. Hall’s characterisation provides a way of 
understanding how and why nationalism expresses a variety of ideological and political 
moods and colours. In this study, it is the symbiotic relationship between nationalism and 
liberalism that developed in the two dominant nationalist groups in Scotland and Quebec in 
the early twentieth century that is the subject of this investigation.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Today the comparative study of contemporary Scotland and Quebec is well developed, there 
is a mini academic industry (often including Catalonia) to which I contribute: the rise and 
election of sub-state nationalist political parties, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the 
Parti Québécois (PQ), and referenda on independence in both nations make this an obvious 
comparison (cf. Henderson 2007; Keating 1996; McEwen 2006). However, in 1900 the 
comparison would not have been evident: Scots were in a position of privilege within the 
British Empire, the junior partner in the new Rome, to paraphrase Tom Nairn; while French 
Canadians, following the defeat of New France, were a European linguistic and religious 
minority within the British Empire that struggled to achieve equity with British-origin 
settlers in Canada. In recognition of these differences, the approach adopted here is 
comparative and historical, but one which places a particular emphasis on the use of contrast 
as much as similarity to acknowledge the very real differences between these cases. This is to 
draw on Clifford Geertz’ (1968: 4) understanding that cases might share both similarity and 
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difference so that ‘at once alike and very different they form a commentary on one another’s 
character’.  
 
The focus is on two nationalist groupings that while being the dominant groups in their 
respective nations contrasted markedly. The Young Scots’ Society (YSS) was founded in 
1900 in the wake of the UK Liberal party’s defeat at that year’s ‘khaki election’. The 
Conservatives and their Liberal Unionist allies triumphed amid a wave of jingoistic fervour 
generated by the on-going South Africa War. This was an historic defeat. It marked the first 
time that the Liberal party had failed to secure a majority of parliamentary seats in Scotland 
since its founding in 1859. The YSS was established to revive Liberal politics and liberal 
ideas, and importantly to foster support for Scottish home rule among the young.  
 
The Society included the young and radical as well as slightly older and more established 
figures. J.M. Hogge, one of its founders and most prominent champion, represents this first 
group. Before being elected as a Liberal MP, Hogge studied theology, securing scholarships 
to study at the University of Edinburgh, and then worked as a social investigator. J.W. 
Gulland exemplified the latter; he too became a Liberal MP, but was the son of a prominent 
Edinburgh corn merchant his Liberal party credentials had been established prior to the 
establishment of the Young Scots. Their initial organisational strength was in Edinburgh and 
the east coast of Scotland: areas that had withstood the Unionist onslaught. However, as the 
decade wore on the centre of gravity shifted within the Society as the Young Scots 
established themselves in Glasgow and the industrial west of Scotland.  
 
Indeed the apogee of the Society was 1911 when it had 56 branches and 3500 members; 
most of these branches and members were located in the west. Roland Muirhead exemplifies 
this last development. Although a long-standing member of the YSS, this Renfrewshire 
based Young Scot was both more nationalist, consistently arguing that Scottish home rule, 
that is a sub-state parliament within the United Kingdom, become its central policy, and his 
liberalism was more socially orientated. He had converted his family’s tannery business into a 
cooperative, and was himself sympathetic to and supportive of the emerging labour 
movement; part funding the socialist newspaper, Forward. In Ralph Dahrendorf’s (2008) 
terms, the Young Scots had undergone a shift from the principles of ‘classical liberalism’ in 
which free trade was prominent to those of ‘social liberalism’ in which social welfare became 
the overriding concern, a shift in which Scottish home rule took an increasingly prominent 
role.2 
 
The YSS was an effective organisation. Through the year each branch offered a syllabus of 
lectures and discussions to educate young men in ‘the principles of liberalism’. In practice 
this was often a curious mixture of topics. However, politically the Young Scots had a 
formidable reputation for electoral campaigning, recognised by friend and foe alike. The YSS 
is contrasted with five individuals most associated with the short-lived Ligue nationaliste 
canadienne, founded in 1903 to promote a vision of an autonomous Canada in opposition to 
                                                        
2 It is worth noting that while one of the first Young Scots’ branches was the Edinburgh 
Women’s branch, thereafter women played only a limited role in the Society. It is likely that 
other organisations presented themselves as more obvious avenues for women’s activism 
during this period both within and outside the Liberal party (Kennedy 2013: 211-2). 
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British imperialism, and one in which French Canada’s position was secure: its founder, 
Olivar Asselin, secretary Omer Héroux, and Quebec City organiser, Armand Lavergne, 
together with Jules Fournier and their mentor, Henri Bourassa.3  
 
These were young men of varied social backgrounds: Asselin and Fournier had attended 
rural collèges classiques in Rimouski and Valleyfield respectively, with the aid of bursaries, 
Héroux attended collège classique in Trois Rivières, while Lavergne and Bourassa, from 
prominent families in Quebec City and Montreal respectively, enjoyed privileged access to 
education. Bourassa was the grandson of Louis-Joseph Papineau, leader of the Patriotes 
rebellions in the 1837-8, and the son the painter Napoléon, while Lavergne’s father was a 
judge at the Quebec Court of Appeal, who had been in practice with the future Canadian 
Prime Minister, Wilfrid Laurier, and his uncle a Liberal MP. Lavergne studied law at Laval 
University, while Bourassa was privately educated. While the Ligue never established itself as 
a formal political organisation, Bourassa and Lavergne served as provincial and federal 
parliamentarians.  
 
However, despite these forays into politics, it was through newspapers that these individuals 
with backgrounds in journalism sought to diffuse their message: Asselin’s Le Nationaliste 
(1905), Fournier’s L’Action (1911) and Le Devoir, founded by Bourassa in 1910 and with 
which Héroux, with a background in Catholic journalism, and the son-in-law of the 
ultramontane nationalist, Jules-Paul Tardivel, became closely associated. These were not 
mass circulation newspapers rather they were newspapers of opinion aimed at an influential 
elite. In tone and politics they contrasted. While Le Devoir was established as a rather pious 
journal that took a conservative view especially with regard to moral matters and the place of 
the Catholic Church, Le Nationaliste and L’Action were combative, campaigning newspapers 
that sought to expose corruption in politics, frequently sued as a result of their claims, and 
providing a forum for liberal ideas. As a collectivity these were French Canadians from 
Quebec who shared a nationalism that was Canadian in orientation, but one in which French 
Canada was to be politically the equal of British Canada.  
 
These groups emerged at a wonderfully exciting historical moment, the belle époque, a 
culturally and socially vibrant period, but one in which politics, too, was questioned with new 
ideas and movements coming to the fore. Liberalism played an important role here: it was 
subjected to critique but it was also drawn on as a means to critically understand the 
institutions that governed and to offer solutions that would enable their more effective 
operation. Political rule in Scotland and Québec at this time was characterised best by a term 
from contemporary political science: multilevel governance. That is to say, both nations were 
governed through the tiered institutions of empire, state and civil society. And it was these 
institutions that both groups addressed in contrasting ways.  
 
The book is based on extensive archival research, drawing on manuscript and printed 
sources in Canada and Scotland. The aim is to use these archival materials to recreate the 
social world of these nationalists and the political and social debates in which they were 
engaged. The papers of Roland E. Muirhead, an early Young Scot member and benefactor, 
                                                        
3 I follow Joseph Levitt (1972) in similarly identifying these individuals as the focus of this 
study.  
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held at the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh and the Mitchell Library in Glasgow 
constitutes the core source for the Scottish case, containing very considerable collection of 
correspondence and a source of many Young Scot publications. Smaller collections were 
also consulted. This was augmented by a targeted examination of the nationalist press, in 
particular The Fiery Cross, The Scottish Patriot and The Scottish Nation and mass press, especially 
The Glasgow Herald and The Scotsman. A similar pattern was followed in Canada. The papers of 
Olivar Asselin at the Archives Municipales de Montréal and Henri Bourassa and Armand 
Lavergne at the Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa were consulted. Again, these 
manuscript collections were augmented by a targeted examination of newspapers most 
especially those that they together with Omer Héroux and Jules Fournier had established 
and contributed to namely, Le Nationaliste, Le Devoir and L’Action. 
 
SUBSTANTIVE CONTRIBUTION 
 
I turn now to the debates these nationalists engaged in around questions that surrounded 
empire, state and civil society. It was imperial questions which initially exercised both groups; 
they responded to Britain’s increasingly predatory policies that marked the South Africa War, 
tariff reform and naval rearmament. Their political programmes addressed the 
accommodation of Scotland and French Canada within their respective states. Immigration 
and schooling were the issues debated by the Nationalistes, both posed an existential threat 
to the place of French Canada within the Canadian Confederation, while the Young Scots 
argued that successive Westminster governments had hindered progressive and democratic 
reform in Scotland. Within each civil society the place of organised religion had a particular 
influence. Liberalism infused each of these debates.   
 
Empire 
 
Herfried Münkler (2007) suggests that as one moves from the centre to the periphery in an 
empire rights decrease, as does the capacity to influence the centre. This insight partly 
captures something of the place of Scots and French Canadians within the British Empire 
and goes some way to explain the very different positions taken by these nationalists in 
response to Britain’s increasingly predatory imperial policies (Go 2011: Ch. 5), which were 
experienced in contrasting ways. This was a moment in which British governments sought 
contributions, financial and otherwise from its dominions and colonies to maintain the 
geopolitical and economic standing of Britain itself. In part, this reflected a shift in the 
thinking of British political elites, a shift from ‘arrogance to anxiety’ occasioned by the rise of 
competition from Germany and the United States in particular (Ferguson 2003: 221). 
 
The Nationalistes experienced these predatory policies as an encroachment on Canadian 
sovereignty. To give expression to this they invoked a liberal view of empire in response. It 
was Canadian participation in the South Africa War that prompted the emergence of the 
nationalist movement. Bourassa and his followers feared that while Prime Minister Wilfrid 
Laurier had only consented to a voluntary force being sent, this had been agreed without a 
debate in the House of Commons and, in Bourassa’s view, had established a dangerous 
precedent for Canada’s future participation in imperial conflicts. At the same time, the 
parallels between the Dutch Boers and French Canadians were strong, and there was 
considerable sympathy even support for their plight. Asselin expressed this writing for the 
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liberal Les Débats in which he pointed to the justice of their fight and congratulated them in 
repulsing a ‘brutal invasion’ (Asselin 1899). 
 
Similarly, Joseph Chamberlain’s ill-fated attempt to impose imperial protectionism was 
vehemently opposed: the Nationalistes understood that this was a cynical exercise entirely in 
Britain’s own interest to ensure that Canada remained a reserve of raw materials and a 
market for British industrial goods. In reality considerable industrialisation was underway in 
Canada in part funded by American capital. Finally, they opposed the British insistence that 
Canada should make a financial contribution to the British Navy in its dreadnought race with 
Germany. Indeed this became the defining issue in the federal election of 1911 in Quebec 
(elsewhere in Canada the issue was free trade with the United States), an election that 
witnessed the election of some seventeen autonomiste candidates in alliance with the 
provincial Conservatives that together secured 48.1% of the vote (Kennedy 2013: 103). In 
response to each of these demands the Nationalistes invoked British Liberals such as John 
Bright, Richard Cobden and Gladstone and asserted that Canada was no longer a colony but 
a self-governing polity, as such each of these policies was an encroachment on its 
sovereignty. Canada had, in other words, reached political maturity and was now in a 
position to decide whether to contribute or not. Cobden, in particular, was drawn on. 
Bourassa offered this reflection: ‘The colonies were given to understand that they were to be 
self-reliant and self-supporting, and that whensoever they thought fit to sever the connection 
with the motherland, no obstacle would be put in the way’ (Bourassa 1902: 19). 
 
In Scotland the very same policies were understood in the terms of UK domestic politics. In 
response to the jingoism that surrounded the outbreak of the South Africa War, the Young 
Scots campaigned for freedom of speech to criticise the government, holding public 
meetings to this end against considerable opposition. This was no easy undertaking given 
that these meetings were frequently broken up by ‘jingo mobs’. The conduct of the war 
described by the Liberal party leader, Campbell Bannerman as utilising ‘methods of 
barbarism’ became a key feature of these meetings. However, there was also a less articulated 
admiration for the Boers in their struggle for national independence. It was both nationalist 
and a liberal sympathy that was expressed, which invoked Gladstone’s denunciation of the 
treatment of national minorities under Ottoman rule. The liberal belief in free trade was 
mobilised against the Unionists’ and in particular the colonial secretary, Joseph 
Chamberlain’s promotion of not only imperial preference but domestic protectionism, a 
misstep that may well on its own have allowed for the Liberal’s return to government in 
1906. For a UK domestic audience it suggested a likely increase in the cost of bread and 
food in general and a sense that its proponents were simply acting in their vested interests. 
The Young Scots took full advantage undertaking an extensive free trade campaign of small 
meetings and larger rallies across Scotland that invoked Gladstone and Cobden in their bid 
to retake ‘Scotland for Liberalism’.  
 
Naval rearmament was more complicated. Many Young Scots held to a certain liberal 
pacifism and opposed increased spending on armaments. However, again it was largely 
British domestic politics that oriented their campaigning. While the People’s Budget of 1909, 
in part, sought to finance rearmament, it was also aimed at funding welfare in particular a 
pensions scheme; land taxation was identified as the means of financing both. So it was land 
reform, and the subsequent opposition by the House of Lords that exercised the Young 
Scots most. The unelected House of Lords where the landed interest was strong had failed 
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to pass the budget, and had initiated a constitutional crisis, forcing the general elections of 
1910. The failure to achieve progressive change in Scotland and the need for a Scottish 
parliament was folded into this constitutional issue. A Young Scot leaflet argued that it was 
not only the House of Lords that was accused of vetoing Scotland’s political will and 
progressive legislation, but the English majority, and called for the abolition of the ‘two 
vetoes’ (Young Scots’ Society 1910). 
 
These groups’ responses to imperial policies reflected the political location of Scotland and 
Quebec within the empire. However, both did so invoking the language of liberalism, and as 
important, they offer a reminder that the Empire was not only characterised by politics and 
trade but it was also an arena in which ideas were diffused, in this case liberal ideas, 
providing a shared set of concepts and personalities that were genuinely debated on both 
sides of the Atlantic, and which could be used to understand and critique the politics of the 
Empire (cf. Mehta 1999). 
 
State  
 
It was in response to the actions, and perhaps also the inaction of their respective states, 
Britain and Canada, that these nationalists formulated their political demands. They did so by 
championing moderate measures: federation for Britain and a Canadian federation that was 
avowedly consociational. The Young Scots’ grievances were political in orientation. The 
home rule campaign grew in prominence through this period. Westminster was characterised 
as ‘inefficient’, its primary focus was on the running of the Empire with only limited time 
and attention available for Scottish affairs. Therefore there was a need for a decentralised 
and devolved Home Rule Parliament in which Scottish issues could be engaged with directly. 
Underlying this efficiency argument were more general progressive and democratic 
arguments. The Young Scots were frustrated that it was appointed boards, the equivalent of 
contemporary quangos, which were given considerable decision-making power but without 
accountability. There was, in other words, a ‘democratic deficit’. Moreover, for the Young 
Scots, home rule was the sine qua non for the implementation of a series of progressive 
measures such as land, education and housing reform.  
 
Home rule was a key and defining commitment for the Young Scots, however, other issues 
had pushed it to the side, namely free trade and land reform. But the tempo of their 
campaign for home rule intensified through this period as Young Scots grew impatient as 
Liberal governments, in 1906 and in January and December 1911, failed to prioritise home 
rule legislation. In response they opposed Liberal parliamentary candidates unsympathetic to 
home rule, joined with other Liberal party organisations to form the Scottish Home Rule 
Council, although for many activists this was not the radical organisation they has hoped for, 
and sought to mobilise Scottish public opinion, achieving a degree of success securing the 
support of local government leaders. In part, debate on the merits of Irish home rule, a more 
urgent question for the British Liberal government, given its dependency on the Irish 
Parliamentary Party after the December 1910 general election, and the loss of its overall 
parliamentary majority, provided the Young Scots with the political opportunity to insist that 
Scottish home rule should be part of a wider federation of the British state. 
 
Of particular interest is the way in which this demand was understood in explicitly liberal 
terms in which a parallel was drawn between individual and group rights. This excerpt from 
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the Young Scots’ ‘Manifesto and Appeal to the Scottish People on Scottish Home Rule’ 
points to the seriousness with which they sought to reconcile both: 
 
The Young Scots bases its case for Home Rule on the principle of Equal Liberty. It 
believes in liberty not only for the individual, but for peoples and nations as well. If 
the individual is to make the most of his faculties and to do his best not only for 
himself but for his fellows, he must be allowed, nay encouraged, to follow his own 
bent, his own aspirations. As it is with individuals, so it is with peoples; and the 
Scottish people, differing in character, custom and law from other peoples that make 
up the United Kingdom, must surely know their requirements best, and if they are to 
make their best contribution to the progress of humanity must be allowed to arrange 
their own affairs, to make and administer their own laws. (Young Scots’ Society 1912: 
2) 
 
This is revealing of the seriousness with which Young Scots sought to understand their 
demand and ensure that it was consistent with liberal thought, and that the logic that applied 
to individuals should be applied to nations. Home rule for Scotland was not a claim for 
special consideration. Rather, the Young Scots’ support for home rule was conceived as part 
of a wider programme of ‘home rule all round’ in which the United Kingdom state would 
become a federation: each component nation, Scotland, England, Ireland and Wales, would 
have its own parliament. However, it was the specific merits of the case for Scottish home 
rule that exercised them most. 
 
In Canada, the Nationalistes sought the formal recognition of French Canadians against a 
backdrop of increased non-francophone immigration and curbs on the teaching in French 
outside Quebec. The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed unprecedented 
immigration to Canada, as a proportion of the Canadian population it remains unmatched: 
between 1901 and 1911 received 1.5 million immigrants, francophones constituted only 
30,000 (Kennedy 2013: 172). The Nationalistes demanded that the same attention and 
resources that were spent on attracting immigrant from the British Isles, or eastern Europe, 
be devoted to attracting immigrants from France or Belgium. At the same time, schooling in 
French had been restricted in Manitoba in 1890, with the creation of the new province of 
Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905, in Keewatin in 1911 and in the most populous province, 
Ontario, with a growing francophone population, following the introduction of Regulation 
17 in 1912 in which English became the sole language in elementary schools, while the study 
of French was reduced to an hour a day. In each case de facto dualism was ended outside 
Quebec. Regulation 17 became a rallying cause for the Nationalistes. However, there were 
differences, for Asselin and Fournier this was a struggle above all about language; in contrast 
for Bourassa, Catholicism and the French language were intimately connected. 
 
Their grievances were existential; these developments appeared to threaten the very 
existence of French Canada. In response they proposed a range of what might be described 
as quasi-consociational arrangements to ensure the French Canadians’ continuing political 
influence. In their writings and speeches they developed many of the features that have since 
become associated with the practice of consociationalism: elite agreement, mutual veto, 
coalition government, maintenance of self-governing communities, and proportionality 
(Lijphart 1977). Indeed it was to elites that much of their attention was directed. Crucially, 
they sought a coalition of French and English-speaking elites: it was these elites that were 
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charged with ensuring a politics marked with mutual respect for the founding British and 
French peoples. In keeping with the prevailing culture of the time no consideration was 
given to the First Nations.  
 
Specifically, elites were to put their devotion to Canada above party interest, in this regard it 
was independent minded individuals from both communities that were sought. There was to 
be mutual recognition that French and British Canada constituted two self-governing 
communities, and that this ‘dualism’ would be respected especially in regard to education. A 
mutual veto could be exercised where dualism was threatened: for the Nationalistes 
immigration and schooling warranted its use. Proportionality, though not a term used by the 
Nationalistes, was also a feature of their political programme: they bemoaned the 
substandard use of French and the limited employment of French Canadians in the federal 
bureaucracy and the absence of the outward symbols of binationalism, notably bilingual 
postage and excise stamps. In essence they sought binational power-sharing, an arrangement 
in which French and British Canadians would be politically and culturally equal.  
 
These proposals appeared to accord well with a moment in which Canada’s internal 
boundaries were in flux: the new provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan were established 
only during this period, in 1905; the District of Keewatin became part of the Northwest 
Territories also in 1905, its southern territory was divided between Manitoba and Ontario, as 
these provinces were extended northwards, in 1912; the boundaries of Quebec, too, were 
extended in 1912 to incorporate the Ungava peninsula. There was, in other words, no neat 
correspondence between language and province. Canada’s internal boundaries were in 
dispute. So the Nationalistes wanted to ensure that French Canadians were protected 
throughout Canada. More than this they wanted to ensure that French Canadians’ standing 
as a founding people was sufficiently recognized. In this respect these Canadian nationalists 
were also French Canadian nationalists, though not Québécois nationalists.  
 
While consociationalism can be considered illiberal in its inclination to confine individuals 
within groups, the Nationalistes’ intention was to ensure that French Canadians as a group 
should be protected; in this it was ‘ostensibly liberal’ (Gray 2000: 128). That is to say, in their 
pronouncements the Nationalistes made a liberal case, but the emphasis was placed on 
group rights, on the rights of French speakers as a collectivity. This was enunciated in the 
reformulated programme that Olivar Asselin proposed in 1909: ‘In Canada’s internal 
relations, the safeguarding of Provincial autonomy on the one hand and of the 
Constitutional Rights of minorities on the other hand’ (Asselin 1909: 4). The Nationalistes 
were keen to emphasise that acknowledging two nations and two languages within a single 
state was entirely consistent with political practice elsewhere. The examples of Belgium and 
Switzerland were frequently drawn on to make the point that ‘the existence of several 
distinct nationalities does not harm the material and intellectual progress of a country’ 
(Asselin 1905). 
 
There was a contrast here in the language used by these groups. The Nationalistes used the 
language of existential threat. There was genuine concern that the expanding Confederation, 
both in terms of population and provinces, was substantially reducing the influence of 
French Canadians. In contrast it was the language of thwarted political democratic progress 
that characterized the Young Scots language. The solutions that these groups offered, 
federation and consociation, reflected the prevailing politics in these nations.  
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Civil Society 
 
The character of their nationalism was also revealed in their participation and engagement in 
their respective distinct civil societies. That is, societies characterised not only by social self-
organisation but also by a degree of civility, in other words a tolerance of difference and 
diversity within the limits of liberalism (Hall 2013: Ch. 1). Scotland’s civil society retained the 
pre-Union institutional ‘holy trinity’ of church, school and law, together with a distinctive 
system of local government. It was around these institutions that early 20th century public 
and private organisations and associations including charities developed. 
 
The Presbyterian churches exercised considerable influence. In effect, liberalism was fused 
with Protestantism, especially its dissenting variant. The 1843 Disruption, which effectively 
split the established Church of Scotland, had bequeathed to Scotland a degree of institutional 
pluralism. The seceding Free Church of Scotland had set up a parallel set of institutions to 
the Church of Scotland with churches, schools and rudimentary welfare in each parish. Many 
Young Scots were members of its successor church, the United Free Church (UFC). 
However, Protestantism’s influence was diffuse, it informed their views and perhaps 
provided them with a moral duty; indeed there was a sense in which religious and social 
salvation were increasingly linked as the UFC began to promote a social gospel as its, and its 
adherents’, orientation shifted from moral concerns such as temperance or gambling to 
social concerns such as the need for state-provided national insurance. Young Scots 
participated across a range of groups and organisations.  
 
In education, the Church of Scotland had lost its dominance with the introduction of state 
system of education in 1872. However, this was not a victory for secular forces. Rather, the 
other Protestant churches and the Catholic Church, growing as result of Catholic Irish 
immigration, viewed this as a victory for religious pluralism: each denomination competed 
for popularly elected boards of education. In the short term, Presbyterianism continued to 
dominate, but it also allowed for secular, Labour candidates to stand, and for social rather 
than religious questions to come to the fore. Young Scots served on these boards: JW 
Gulland, a UFC elder, in Edinburgh, while progressive UFC minister, James Barr was elected 
as an independent in Glasgow. The Young Scots championed Irish home rule and in this 
regard this largely Protestant organisation was willing to accommodate a key demand of 
Catholic Irish immigrants to Scotland. Indeed, a leading Young Scot, FJ Robertson, the 
secretary of the Protestant Knox Club, was accused of a betrayal of Protestantism (Edinburgh 
Evening News 1913). 
 
The Catholic Church occupied a position of considerable importance in francophone 
Quebec’s civil society. Law, like Scotland, was distinct. By contrast, in Quebec liberals were 
at loggerheads with the Catholic Church across a range of areas. The Church, fearful of 
modernity and its associated materialism, sought to cage its members through its ‘stratégies 
d’encadrement’ (Linteau, et al. 1989: 606-8) in which it sought to control its flock by 
establishing its own array of organisations and associations e.g. youth organisations, trade 
unions, libraries, as well as newspapers, all within a Catholic framework. However, liberal 
openings were possible, especially where this Church did not have an established dominance. 
This was the backdrop against which the Nationalistes were divided. Bourassa, Héroux and 
Lavergne remained committed to the Catholic Church retaining a leading role in society, 
 12 
while Asselin and Fournier, themselves practicing Catholics, preferred to view it as a moral 
guide and were critical of the Church and its interventions in politics. However, their 
liberalism was not anti-clerical, and it contrasted with the more strident secularism of those 
such as Godfroy Langlois and his Ligue d’enseignement. Indeed for these practising 
Catholics it was British-style liberalism, with its tolerance of religious diversity, rather than 
French secular republicanism that held an attraction.  
 
For example, while the Nationalistes supported the reform of the education system, there 
was division. Fournier and Asslein favoured compulsory schooling, and were convinced of 
the need for education to more closely provide francophone Quebecers with vocational 
skills to meet the labour demands of a growing industrial economy. Bourassa was wary, and 
critical of the newly created École des Hautes Études commerciales, which he labelled an 
‘école sans Dieu’, believing that vocational teaching had to be complemented by religious 
teaching which was absent from the École’s curriculum (Levitt 1972: 88). Moreover, 
Fournier was keen to extend French education in Quebec to the immigrant Jewish 
population. This was a way of increasing French-speakers. In contrast, Lavergne and Héroux 
expressed views that were anti-Semitic. Bourassa’s views also veered toward the anti-Semitic, 
though he had supported the right of Jews to work on Sundays in Quebec. Asselin and 
Fournier were more willing to reach accommodation with this growing community. They 
practiced that definitional tenet of civil society, namely civility or tolerance (Hall 2013), 
something absent from their colleagues, and supported forms of political and ecclesiastical 
moderation.  
 
The role of the Church in both civil societies was important. Religious pluralism in Scotland 
ensured that no one church dominated. But Presbyterianism was a powerful influence, which 
reinforced liberalism, and together they promoted individualism and progress. The Catholic 
Church was dominant; its presence was felt through Quebec’s civil life. While liberalism was 
more fragile in Quebec’s civil society, liberal reform was underway, not least in education 
where the church was in control. Catholicism’s uneasy accommodation with liberalism was 
reflected in division among the Nationalistes. These civil societies, reflecting the degree to 
which liberalism was institutionalised, had a marked influence on the character of the 
nationalisms expressed by the Young Scots and the Nationalistes.  
 
It was these changes in political rule, in the running of empire, state and civil society that 
prompted the emergence of these liberal nationalisms. However, these changes not only 
stimulated nationalist responses but also shaped their comparatively liberal character.  
 
REFLECTIONS 
 
The choice of William Ewart Gladstone, the long serving British Prime Minister, for the 
book cover was deliberate. Gladstone dominated late 19th century British and imperial liberal 
politics. Both the Young Scots and the Nationalistes laid claim to his legacy in the early 20th 
century. Indeed the Young Scots’ initial motto was ‘For Gladstone and Scotland’. This 
English, patrician, High Anglican Prime Minister had a considerable appeal to both groups; 
both groups invoked him in their campaigns, though the ways in which they did contrasted. 
It suggests that there is something malleable about liberalism itself, allowing for it to be 
drawn on and expressed with different emphases.  
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There are, I think, three general conclusions that this book suggests about nationalism and 
its relationship with liberalism: that liberalism did indeed provide much of the content for 
the nationalisms promoted by these individuals and groups, though the ways in which it did 
suggests two quite distinct liberal nationalisms; in both a symbiotic relationship had 
established between liberalism and nationalism.  I take this opportunity to reflect on and 
extend these arguments and suggest an additional fourth conclusion that liberalism is 
successful when it is enmeshed in nationalism.  
 
The first is that liberalism did indeed provide much of the content for these nationalisms 
during this period. Certainly, ethnic markers, in the broad anthropological sense outlined 
earlier were invoked, notably language in the case of French Canadians, but also religion, the 
question of Church disestablishment exercised Young Scots at the early part of the decade; 
the history of Scots and French Canadians was invoked: the six hundredth anniversary of the 
Battle of Bannockburn was celebrated in 1914; while the Nationalistes were keen to invoke 
French settlers to the New World and their adherence to Catholicism. However, in making 
their political claims it was liberalism that was the defining feature for both groups. 
 
Yet at the same time, there were other ideological influences, as this quote from Olivar 
Asselin makes clear liberalism was one among other ideologies and issues, which marked 
their nationalism: 
 
We are Liberals in the matter of minority rights, and Progressists in economic and 
social matters. And it is that opposition to [British] Imperialism and [American] 
Annexation, that Liberalism and that Progressism, which make up our brand of 
nationalism (Asselin 1909: 60-1). 
 
But importantly liberalism and nationalism were mutually reinforcing; they were not mutually 
exclusive. It is perhaps notable that liberalism in the Canadian context was associated most 
with the protection of minority rights, in this case the language rights of French Canadians 
outside Quebec, while liberalism’s social variant was associated with American 
progressivism. Among the Young Scots there was clear evidence that classical liberal 
concerns were increasingly being replaced by more social or ‘new liberal’ concerns that 
suggested a greater role for the state in the provision of welfare and social services. The 
liberal character of these nationalisms was very clearly a reflection of this particular historical 
moment. In subsequent decades it was other ideologies that became entwined with 
nationalism in Scotland and Quebec. In the interwar period in Quebec, and, in part, a 
response to the failure of this moderate pan-Canadian nationalism, it was Lionel Groulx and 
a more conservative and religious nationalism that came to the fore, while in interwar 
Scotland nationalists sought collectivist solutions through socialism and the emerging 
Labour movement. 
 
Secondly, and relatedly it suggests that as with liberalism there are two faces of liberal 
nationalism (cf. Gray 2000): one in which the emphasis is on equality among groups, the 
other in which there is a greater attempt to reconcile individual and group rights. The 
influences, especially the place of the Church, and the positions taken by these groups in 
their respective civil societies is reflective of this. More generally, it was reflective of the 
challenges that liberalism faced during this period. Liberalism itself was under pressure to 
include those excluded (women) and those partially excluded (working class men) from the 
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polity but also to offer recognition of minority nations (Ireland). As a result of these 
collectivist demands liberalism was redefined, making possible the emergence of a new social 
liberalism in place of classical liberalism, one that better accommodated these demands. 
Liberal nationalism in Quebec placed greater emphasis on group rights while in Scotland 
there was an attempt to reconcile group with individual rights. In part, this was a reflection 
of two different processes as Liberals in Scotland were acquiring a more national character, 
and nationalists in Quebec sought to frame their demands through liberalism. This was 
related to another difference, namely the way in which these nationalists viewed democracy: 
Young Scots sought to address their demands to a growing, mass electorate, organising 
branches throughout Scotland, while the Nationalistes sought to influence elites, largely 
through newspapers. 
 
Thirdly, it suggests that liberalism and nationalism were acting in service of one another; a 
symbiotic relationship had developed which was mutually beneficial. An anonymous Young 
Scot stated this explicitly  
 
If Scottish Nationalism, in alliance with Liberalism, is to succeed, not only in 
maintaining the electoral predominance of the [Liberal] party … but if it is to succeed 
in actively enlisting Scottish youth in the ranks of the party, it must devote itself more 
and more to the cultivation of the national idea (Anonymous Young Scot 1910). 
 
Both the Young Scots and the Nationalistes sought ways in which liberalism could better 
accommodate the interests of Scots and French Canadians, concluding that for liberalism to 
work better it had to take a national form, and offer a recognition of national difference. It 
was this that these groups sought to achieve through their demands for federation and 
consociation. In doing so, they demanded what Charles Taylor (1993: 190) refers to as an 
‘equal hearing’, arguing that the views of Scots and French Canadians should have the same 
legitimacy as the majority, and to ensure this there had to be a better fit between political 
institutions and popular sovereignty. In turn, nationalism offered political liberalism a means 
of ensuring that it remained politically relevant at time in which it faced a series of 
challenges. Yet in both nations the First World War would fundamentally change this 
relationship.  
 
Finally, and more speculatively, the book and this research suggest that while liberalism does 
indeed moderate nationalism, nationalism makes liberalism possible. The implied argument 
from Michael Hechter’s (2000) Containing Nationalism was that nationalism is a destructive 
ideology that must be harnessed. And given the often bloody historical record in which 
nationalism is implicated, it is difficult to argue with this. However, this is only one aspect of 
nationalism’s chequered history. There is another. Classically, nationalism and liberalism 
emerged together in 19th century Europe, and established an historical pattern in which 
liberalism was successful when married with nationalism, stronger when embedded in 
nationalism. Equally, liberalism failed when it was seen as alien and imposed from the 
outside (Mongiu-Pippidi 2015: 92-3). What is important about this historical moment is that 
liberalism, in different ways, infused these nationalisms. In other words, liberalism was 
enmeshed in the national framework. There was nothing inevitable about this. At other 
moments, most especially during the interwar period, the dominant nationalisms in both 
nations did not share this liberal character, and was more collectivist in orientation. This 
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book has suggested that political rule played a decisive role not only in instigating 
nationalism but also in shaping the character of these nationalisms. 
 
There are echoes of these liberal nationalisms in the politics of contemporary nationalism in 
Scotland and Quebec. In the run up to the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the 
SNP Scottish Government signalled that ‘a commitment to a multi-cultural Scotland will be 
a cornerstone of the nation on independence’ sketching an inclusive model of citizenship 
that took account of whether or not individuals viewed themselves as partially or exclusively 
Scottish, and made reference to the reality of individuals’ multiple identities (Scottish 
Government 2013: 271). In contrast, in 2013 the PQ Quebec Government’s proposed 
‘Charter of Values’ was restrictive, most especially with its insistence that public employees 
should not wear or display religious symbols. The danger, as Gérard Bouchard (2015: 152) 
points out, with this latter development is that it not only suggested a break with decades of 
pluralism in Quebec but also spelled the end of ‘a very successful combination of 
nationalism and liberalism’. This to say, the relationship between liberalism and nationalism 
continues to be important and as these recent events make clear it is implicated in current 
debates in Scotland and Quebec.   
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